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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1406 
 ___________ 
 
 PEDRO MIQUEL DASILVA, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; PRISON P.I.C.C. 
ON STATE ROAD 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-03588) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 18, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (filed: January 20, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pedro Miquel P. DaSilva appeals from the orders of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint as frivolous and 
denying relief from the judgment.  We will vacate the judgment and remand the matter 
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for further proceedings. 
 DaSilva filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, naming as 
defendants the Sheriff=s Department, the City of Philadelphia (ACity@), and Prison 
P.I.C.C. on State Road.  DaSilva alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when 
he was struck in the face several times by an officer of the Sheriff=s Department.  The 
complaint does not specify a date on which the beating occurred, but DaSilva stated that 
he filed a grievance concerning the issue on June 28, 2007.  DaSilva, who is now an 
inmate of the State Correctional Institution at Cresson, Pennsylvania, signed his 
complaint on June 20, 2009, but his accompanying motion for leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis (AIFP@) was not certified by the appropriate prison official until July 17, 2009.  
The IFP motion was filed on August 6, 2009 and was granted on August 11, 2009, and 
the complaint was filed on the docket that same day.  The City executed a waiver of 
service. 
DaSilva filed a motion to amend the complaint to add as a defendant the Warden 
of the prison to which he was being transferred at the time of the beating.  Before the 
expiration of the time that the City had to respond to the complaint, the District Court 
dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), noting that 
DaSilva had not alleged personal involvement on the part of any defendant concerning 
the beating.  The District Court also denied DaSilva=s motion to amend as moot.  Shortly 
thereafter, the City filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the incident allegedly occurred 
on or before June 28, 2007, but that the complaint was filed in August 2009, beyond the 
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applicable two-year limitations period.  DaSilva filed a document that was construed as a 
response to the City=s motion to dismiss though the document did not relate to the 
timeliness issue, but rather explained that DaSilva had been unable to ascertain the names 
of the officers who assaulted him despite his efforts to do so.  By order entered 
November 2, 2009, the District Court denied the City=s motion as moot, and struck 
DaSilva=s response to the motion from the record. 
On December 14,  2009, DaSilva filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the 
September 30, 2009 order.  He protested, among other things, that he had not been given 
an opportunity to amend his complaint by naming additional defendants and describing 
their involvement in the action.  By order entered December 31, 2009, the District Court 
denied the Rule 60(b) motion, noting that amendment would have been futile because the 
action was barred by the statute of limitations.  Further, citing a not precedential opinion 
by this Court and noting that DaSilva signed his complaint and IFP application within the 
presumed bounds of the statute of limitations, the District Court concluded that the 
several-week delay by the prison official who certified DaSilva=s prison account balance 
did not warrant equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.  (See District Court Dec. 31, 
2009 Order at 2 (citing Lyons v. Emerick, 187 Fed. Appx. 219, 221 (3d Cir. 2006)(not 
precedential))).  This appeal followed.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
We first address the scope of the appeal.  DaSilva=s notice of appeal is dated 
January 28, 2010 and was filed on February 1, 2010.  The City does not dispute the 
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timeliness of the appeal concerning the District Court=s December 31, 2009 order denying 
Rule 60(b) relief.  DaSilva=s notice of appeal also refers to the District Court=s order 
dismissing the case, but the notice was filed outside the time for appeal under Rule 
4(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.  On this basis, the City asserts 
that we lack jurisdiction to review the dismissal order.  However, it is clear from the 
record that the District Court’s dismissal order did not comply with the separate 
document requirement of Rule 58(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Leboon v. 
Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (an order must 
“omit (or at least substantially omit) the trial court’s reasons for disposing of the 
claims”).  For purposes of Rule 4, the District Court’s September 30, 2009 order would 
be deemed Aentered@ 150 days after it was entered on the docket, and the Rule 4 deadline 
for appeal would run thereafter.  See LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 223 (discussing entry of 
judgment under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)).
1
  We conclude 
that we have jurisdiction to review both of the orders appealed. 
We next address the City’s argument that we need not reach the merits of the 
appeal.  The City contends that DaSilva has waived all arguments because he fails to 
raise any alleged errors by the District Court in his brief.  Generally, we agree with the 
proposition that an appellant’s failure to present and argue issues in the opening brief 
                                                 
1
  Although DaSilva=s notice of appeal was filed before the 150-day period  
elapsed, that circumstance does not prevent us from entertaining the appeal.  LeBoon, 
503 F.3d at 224 n.5. 
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would result in waiver of the issues on appeal.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 
(3d Cir.1993); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a).  However, DaSilva proceeds pro se, and 
accordingly, we construe his pleadings liberally.  See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 
520-21 (1972).  We are satisfied that DaSilva’s response to question five in his informal 
brief presents a challenge to both the dismissal of his claim as frivolous and the denial of 
his motion for relief from judgment.  Specifically, DaSilva’s brief expresses his 
disagreement with the District Court’s rulings, including the denial of his motion to 
amend his complaint.  We will proceed to review the merits of the appeal. 
The District Court sua sponte dismissed DaSilva=s complaint under section 
1915(e) because DaSilva failed to name the responsible defendants with specificity.  
However, the District Court failed to provide any opportunity for DaSilva to amend the 
complaint to name those defendants and denied DaSilva’s motion to amend as moot.  
Given the early stage of proceedings at the time of dismissal, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that amendment would have been inequitable or futile.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002).  It is not impossible that DaSilva 
could have named the proper defendants if he had been granted a period of time to file an 
amended complaint.2 
                                                 
 
2
  Because the City took the position that we lack jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s order dismissing the case and denying DaSilva’s initial motion to amend the 
complaint, the City argues that the discretion vested by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15 to permit amendment “freely” does not apply to this case.  Instead, the City argues that 
DaSilva’s post-judgment request to amend was subject to the Rule 60(b) standard for 
reopening, and, as of that late date, DaSilva could not have met the notice requirements 
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The District Court’s later decision denying DaSilva=s motion to reopen 
acknowledges Grayson but concludes that amendment would be futile because the action 
was barred by the statute of limitations.  This decision is problematic in light of the 
procedural history of the case.  The District Court’s dismissal of the complaint was a sua 
sponte decision under section 1915(e).  Although the City raised the statute of limitations 
in its motion to dismiss, the motion was dismissed as moot.  Thus, DaSilva had no viable 
opportunity to respond to the City=s statute of limitations arguments given that the case 
already had been dismissed.  Indeed, the District Court ordered that DaSilva=s response to 
the City=s mooted motion to dismiss be struck from the record. 
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).  This 
Court has not addressed the issue in a precedential decision, but other courts have held 
that, while the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may sua 
sponte dismiss a complaint under section 1915(e) on this basis when the defense is 
obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required.  See, 
e.g., Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006).  In this case, the District 
Court determined that DaSilva missed the applicable two-year deadline for filing suit by 
little more than one month.  The record reflects that DaSilva signed the complaint on 
June 20, 2009--a date within the limitations period used by the District Court--but that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
of Rules 15(c) and 4(m) for any amendment to “relate back” under Rule 15(c).  We have 
rejected the argument that we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s September 
30, 2009 order, and thus, we reject the City’s arguments that we should view the case 
only through a post-judgment lens. 
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complaint was not “filed” until after the District Court issued its August 11, 2009 order 
granting DaSilva’s IFP application and directing the complaint to be filed.  However, the 
record as it now exists for our review does not show when the complaint was actually 
submitted to the clerk for filing.  See Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 
451, 457 and n.8 (statute of limitations is met when a complaint is “submitted” to the 
clerk before the statute runs; formal filing of the complaint relates back to the date of 
submission); McDowell v. Delaware, 88 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1996) (complaint is 
deemed constructively filed as of the date the clerk received the complaint, even if it is 
not formally filed until the fee requirement is ultimately met).  While the IFP application 
bears a prison certification date of July 17, 2009, the complaint bears no other date than 
the date on which it was signed, June 20, 2009.  Although it may be that the IFP 
application and complaint were submitted to the clerk on the same date, the record as it 
stands is not conclusive on this point. 
In addition, although the District Court rejected an anticipated possible equitable 
tolling argument based on the prison’s delay in certifying DaSilva=s account balance, we 
are not bound by the not precedential decision in Lyons.  Moreover, notwithstanding 
Lyons, DaSilva might well have another equitable tolling argument that he had no 
opportunity to present.
3
  We conclude that it is not “patently clear” from the record before 
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 We note that, in a document filed with the District Court on March 1, 2010 as 
well as in his informal brief in our Court, DaSilva indicated that he was abandoned by his 
attorney about seventeen months after the incident occurred.  This may also provide a 
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us that the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal and denial of reopening were justified on 
the statute of limitations basis.  See Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258-59 (sua sponte dismissal on 
statute of limitations grounds would not be appropriate where it is not patently clear that 
equitable tolling would not apply). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and 
remand for further proceedings. 
                                                                                                                                                             
basis for tolling the statute of limitations.  Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 
2001) (remanding so that district court could conduct a hearing to determine whether 
plaintiff-appellant was entitled to equitable tolling based on attorney abandonment).  
Additionally, it may be appropriate to toll the statute of limitations for the period during 
which DaSilva was exhausting his prison remedies, though we do not decide that issue 
today.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001) (ordinarily, 
administrative grievance process tolls the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action). 
